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Abstract
We discuss Boltzmann’s probabilistic explanation of the second law
of thermodynamics providing a comprehensive presentation of what is
called today the typicality account. Countering its misconception as an
alternative explanation, we examine the relation between Boltzmann’s
H-theorem and the general typicality argument demonstrating the con-
ceptual continuity between the two. We then discuss the philosophical
dimensions of the concept of typicality and its relevance for scientific
reasoning in general, in particular for understanding the reduction of
macroscopic laws to microscopic laws. Finally, we reply to various
common criticisms of the typicality account.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, a series of papers by various distinguished math-
ematical physicists stressed the importance of the concept of typicality as a
basis for probabilistic reasoning in physics, in particular as a basis for the
explanation of the second law of thermodynamics in statistical mechanics
(Lebowitz, 1993; Bricmont, 1995; Penrose, 1999; Goldstein, 2001). None of
the authors took much credit for the ideas he presented, each of them rather
stressed that he was recapturing or reformulating the groundbreaking in-
sights of Ludwig Boltzmann who, more than one century ago, had shown how
to explain and derive macroscopic regularities from the underlying laws gov-
erning the motion of the microscopic constituents of matter. However, rein-
troducing these ideas to physicists, mathematicians and philosophers proved
to be highly necessary as their relevance is rarely appreciated today and the
response to the papers of Lebowitz, Goldstein and others shows that they
are still subject to widespread misconceptions and misunderstandings.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive summary of the typicality
account, spelling out some of the details and subtleties that have remained
unspoken in the before-mentioned presentations, thus leaving room for ob-
jections and misunderstandings that we hope to eliminate (Section 2). We
then demonstrate the conceptual continuity between this typicality account
and Boltzmann’s famous H-theorem, showing that it is false that they are
often viewed as competing accounts of macroscopic irreversibility (Section
3). Putting things in wider perspective, we discuss the relevance of typi-
cality for scientific reasoning in general, in particular for understanding the
reduction of macroscopic laws to microscopic laws (Section 4). Finally, we
address some of the most common objections against the typicality account
that have been raised in the contemporary literature (Section 5).
2 The typicality account
2.1 Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics
Our discussion is concerned with the explanation of the irreversible thermo-
dynamic behavior of macroscopic systems. The term “thermodynamic be-
havior” thereby refers to the ubiquitous phenomenon that physical systems,
prepared or created in a non-equilibrium state and then suitably isolated
from the environment, tend to evolve to and then stay in a distinguished
macroscopic configuration called the equilibrium state. Familiar examples
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are the spreading of a gas, the mixing of milk and coffee, the disappearance
of temperature gradients, and so on.
Historically, this empirical regularity was captured by the second law of
thermodynamics, positing the monotonous increase of a macroscopic variable
of state called entropy, which attains its maximum value in equilibrium. The
main task of statistical mechanics is to explain this macroscopic regularity
on the basis of the underlying laws guiding the behavior of the system’s
micro-constituents.
A crucial ingredient to the understanding of this issue is the distinction
between macro- and microstate of a system. Whereas the microstate X(t) of
a system is given by the complete specification of all its microscopic degrees
of freedom, its macrostate M(t) is specified in terms of physical variables
that characterize the system on macroscopic scales (like its volume, pressure,
temperature, and so on). The macroscopic state of a system is completely
determined by its microscopic configuration, that is M(t) = M(X(t)), but
one and the same macrostate can be realized by a large number of differ-
ent microstates all of which “look macroscopically the same”. The parti-
tioning of the set of microstates into sets corresponding to macroscopically
distinct states is therefore called a coarse-graining. Turning to the phase-
space picture of Hamiltonian mechanics for an N -particle system, a mi-
crostate corresponds to one point X = (q, p) in phase space Ω ∼= R3N ×R3N ,
q = (q1, q2, ..., qN ) being the position- and p = (p1, p2, ..., pN ) the momentum-
coordinates of the N particles, whereas a macrostate M corresponds to an
entire region ΓM ⊆ Ω of phase space, namely the set of all microstates that
realize M . The microscopic laws of motion are such that any initial mi-
crostate X0 determines the complete microevolution X(t) = φt(X0) of the
system, represented by a unique trajectory in phase space going through
X0, thereby also determining its complete macro-evolution M(X(t)) as the
microstate passes through different macro-regions.
These concepts are pretty much forced on us if we accept the superve-
nience of macroscopic facts on microscopic facts and they are essential to
appreciating the nature of the problem. The second law of thermodynamics
describes an empirical regularity about the macro-evolution M(t) of a phys-
ical system. This macro-evolution, however, supervenes on the evolution of
the system’s microscopic configuration which is determined by precise and
unambiguous laws of motion. The aspiration of statistical mechanics is thus
to explain or justify the empirical regularity expressed in the macroscopic
law on the basis of the underlying microscopic theory. This seems like a quite
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formidable task, though, as it requires us to reconcile the irreversibility of
thermodynamic behavior with the time-reversal symmetry of the microscopic
laws of motion. The task was nevertheless accomplished by Ludwig Boltz-
mann at the end of the 19th century. His account, we recall, was crucially
based on two profound insights:
1. The identification of the (Clausius) entropy with the (logarithm of) the
phase-space volume corresponding to its current macrostate. Formally:
S = kB ln |ΓM(X)|, (1)
where kB is the Boltzmann constant and |ΓM | denotes the volume
(the Lebesgue or Liouville measure) of the phase-space region ΓM .
The Boltzmann entropy is thus de facto a logarithmic measure of the
phase-space volume corresponding to the system’s macrostate.
2. The understanding that the separation of scales between the micro-
scopic and the macroscopic level leads to enormous differences in the
phase-space volume corresponding to states with different values of en-
tropy. In particular, we will generally find that the equilibrium region
– by definition the region of maximum entropy – is vastly larger than
any other macro-region, so large, in fact, that it exhausts almost the
entire phase space. In other words: almost every microstate is an
equilibrium state.
The two points are actually related in the following sense: Note that the log-
arithm in equation (1) makes it that substantial differences in S correspond
to huge differences in the respective phase-space measure. And note that
the separation of scales between micro- and macro-level, that is, in particu-
lar, the number of microscopic degrees of freedom in a macroscopic system,
is characterized by Avogadro’s constant which is of the order of 1023. And
since the entropy associated with specific values of the macroscopic observ-
ables will in general grow with N (the thermodynamic entropy is a so-called
extensive variable of state), this means that the differences in phase-space
volume corresponding to different entropy levels will depend exponentially
on this already huge number. In other words, we will generally find that for
macroscopic systems, i.e. for systems with a very large number of micro-
scopic degrees of freedom, the partitioning of microstates into macrostates
does not correspond to a partitioning of phase space into regions of roughly
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the same size, but into regions whose sizes vary by a great many orders of
magnitude, with the equilibrium region being by far the largest.
These insights are the key ingredients in Boltzmann’s account of the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics. What we learn from them is, first and foremost,
that the thermodynamic behavior that we want to explain is not a feature of
certain special micro-evolutions, but rather the kind of macro-behavior that
would correspond to almost any conceivable trajectory that the configuration
of a macroscopic system, starting in a non-equilibrium region, could follow
through phase space. Indeed, the dynamics of a system whose microscopic
configuration starts out in a tiny non-equilibrium macro-region would have
to be very peculiar to avoid carrying the microstate into larger and larger
phase-space volumes – corresponding to gradually increasing entropy – and
finally into the equilibrium region, where it will remain for the foreseeable
future. This is why Boltzmann’s arguments are extremely robust against the
details of the microscopic theory, giving us an understanding of thermody-
namic behavior as a virtually universal feature of macroscopic systems (see
also the insightful remarks in Einstein’s ‘autobiographical notes’, 1949).
On the other hand, recent publications have devoted many pages to
pointing out the obvious fact that if we consider a system in an initial non-
equilibrium microstate, we cannot plausibly conclude that it must evolve
into equilibrium solely on the basis that the equilibrium-region is vastly
larger than the non-equilibrium region (e.g. Uffink 2008; Frigg 2009, 2011,
see also the discussion in Section 5). This is, as such, a correct observation
though one cannot stress enough that, as a point of criticism, it doesn’t per-
tain in any way to what the typicality account actually claims – or to what
Boltzmann had claimed at least after 1876.
Indeed, we even know for a fact that, given a low-entropy macrostateM ,
there exist microscopic configurations realizing M that will not evolve into
equilibrium but follow a trajectory of decreasing entropy instead. And this
is not, in the first place, due to any involved mathematical or philosophical
argument, but a straightforward consequence of the time-reversal symmetry
of the microscopic laws, as was famously pointed out by Johann Loschmidt
in his “reversibility objection”. Hence, Lebowitz rightly warned us, quoting
Ruelle, that the ideas of Boltzmann are “at the same time simple and rather
subtle” (1993, p. 7). We will elaborate on these subtleties in the following
section.
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2.2 The typicality account
To build on the basic principles of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics and
go into the details of the typicality account, let’s discuss the paradigmatic
example of a gas in a box. We thus consider a system of N ≈ 1023 particles,
interacting by a repelling short-range potential, which are confined to a finite
volume within a box with reflecting walls. Now assume that we find or
prepare the gas in the macrostate M2 sketched below (Fig. 1), that is, we
consider a particle configuration that looks, macroscopically, like a gas filling
out about half of the accessible volume. What kind of macroscopic evolution
should we predict for this system?
Figure 1: Thermodynamic evolution of a gas
Well, a simple combinatorial argument due to Boltzmann shows that the
overwhelming majority of microstates that the system could possibly evolve
into will look, macroscopically, like Meq, i.e. like a gas that is homoge-
neously distributed over the entire volume of the box. In fact, one can
readily conclude that the phase-space volume corresponding to this equilib-
rium macrostate Meq is about 2N ≈ 101023 times (!) larger than the phase-
space volume occupied by configurations with substantially lower entropy
(in agreement with our general reasoning above). Hence, as the particles
move with different speeds in different directions, scattering from each other
and occasionally from the walls, the system’s microstate wanders around on
an erratic path in the high-dimensional phase space and we would expect,
by all reasonable means, that this path will soon end up in the equilibrium
region ΓMeq and then leave ΓMeq only very rarely, corresponding to small
fluctuations of the entropy about its maximal value. (Larger fluctuations,
e.g. from Meq back into M2, are possible as well, however, as Boltzmann
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(1896b) already noted, the time-scales on which substantial fluctuations are
to be expected are so astronomical that they have no empirical relevance.)
However, it is clear – and it was clear to Boltzmann – that there are initial
conditions in ΓM2 for which the system will not exhibit this “expected” (we
will later say typical) macro-behavior, but follow an anti-thermodynamic
trajectory of decreasing entropy. For if we consider a macrostate of even
lower entropy, M1, the time-reversal symmetry of the equations of motions
implies that for every solution corresponding to a macro-evolution from M1
to M2, there exists another solution carrying an initial microstate in ΓM2
into the lower-entropy macro-region ΓM1 . (Indeed, we only have to take the
solutions that have evolved from ΓM1 into ΓM2 and reverse the momenta of
every single particle.) And yet, as Boltzmann understood, the microscopic
initial conditions in ΓM2 that lead to such an anti-thermodynamic evolution
are extremely special ones relative to all possible microstates realizing M2.
The correct assertion is thus that almost all initial configurations in ΓM2 will
evolve into the equilibrium-region ΓMeq , while only a very small set of “bad”
initial conditions will show the anti-thermodynamic evolution from ΓM2 into
ΓM1 . We will make these arguments more precise in a minute.
For now, let us note that it’s more appropriate, in fact, not to consider
any individual trajectory but the set of all solutions with initial condition
in ΓM2 . The dynamics of a system of about N ≈ 1023 particles is very
chaotic, in the sense that even small variations in the initial configuration
can lead to considerable differences in the time-evolution. Under the Hamil-
tonian dynamics, the set of microstates realizing M2 at the initial time will
thus quickly spread over phase space (respectively a submanifold compatible
with the constants of motion) with the overwhelming majority of microstates
ending up in the equilibrium-region and only a small fraction of special ini-
tial configurations evolving into the comparably tiny macro-regions of equal
or lower entropy.
(A side-note on the last point: “chaos” is one of those notions that are no-
toriously difficult to exhaust by precise mathematical definitions, though it’s
clear that some form of dynamical instability is characteristic of thermody-
namic systems with many degrees of freedom. Various attempts to capture
this characteristic by rigorous – and usually very idealized – mathematical
concepts, as well as the fruitfulness of some of these concepts for the respec-
tive fields of mathematics, have often created the impression that any one
them in particular must play a central role in the foundations of statistical
mechanics. However, as stressed before, the explanation of thermodynamic
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behavior is much more robust against the details of the microscopic model
and doesn’t hinge on any narrowly conceived property of the underlying dy-
namics. In particular, the relevant systems might easily fail to be ergodic, or
mixing, or have everywhere positive Lyapunov exponents – to throw around
some jargon –, and they probably do, though their overall behavior would
have to be completely qualitatively different from what it’s generally under-
stood to be in order to render the typicality account irrelevant.)
To summarize our discussion, Boltzmann’s analysis tells us that it cannot
be true that every non-equilibrium configuration will follow the second law
of thermodynamics and undergo an evolution of increasing entropy. The
appropriate conclusion, however, is that typical microscopic configurations
realizing a low-entropy initial macrostate will evolve into equilibrium and
then stay in equilibrium for most of the time.
It should go without saying, though we have to emphasize nonetheless,
that this typicality account is an explanation or an explanatory scheme –
not a proof. As plausible as the conclusion may be, proving it in a rigorous
fashion for any particular (reasonably complex) model remains an extremely
difficult and largely unresolved problem in mathematical physics.
2.3 The measure of typicality
Throughout the above argument, the intuitive notions of almost all and
extremely special, that we used synonymously to typical/atypical, were un-
derstood in terms of the stationary Liouville measure, i.e. in terms of the
phase-space volume corresponding to the set of microstates that have the re-
spective property. More precisely, for a perfectly isolated system with total
energy E, we would have to consider instead of the Liouville measure the
induced microcanonical measure µE on the hypersurface ΓE ⊂ Ω, to which
the motion of the system is confined in virtue of the energy conservation. For
simplicity, we will usually omit this distinction and merely refer to “phase
space” and the “measure” or “size” of macro-regions.
In any case, a crucial property of the Liouville measure as well as the
microcanonical measure is their stationarity under the microscopic time-
evolution. Intuitively, this is to say that the Hamiltonian flow φt behaves
like an incompressible fluid on phase space. Formally, it means that for all
measurable sets A ⊆ Ω and all times t ∈ R, we have |φt(A)| = |A|. This is
such an essential feature because it means that
a) the notion of typicality is timeless, i.e. a typicality statement does not
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depend on a reference to any external time-parameter.
b) the Hamiltonian dynamics “care about” the size of the macro-regions that
play such a central role in the argument, in the sense that the station-
ary measure as a measure on initial conditions carries over to a well-
defined measure on solution trajectories, which is such that the number
of trajectories passing through a phase-space region at any given time is
proportional to the size of that region.
Turning back to Boltzmann’s explanation of the second law, we note that the
Liouville measure (respectively the microcanonical measure) as a typicality
measure serves two purposes in the argument:
1. To establish that the region of phase space corresponding to the macrostate
M2 is very much larger than the region of phase space corresponding to
the macrostate M1, and that the region of phase space corresponding
to the equilibrium macrostate Meq is very much larger than the region
of phase space corresponding to the macrostate M2, so large, in fact,
that it occupies almost the entire phase-space volume.
It is easy to learn about this “dominance of the equilibrium state”
(Frigg, 2009) and yet hard to appreciate what it is really saying, since
the scale of the proportions expressed by the innocuous term “almost
entirely” are beyond anything that we could intuitively grasp (just
think of the ratio 101023 : 1 for the gas-model).
Note that together with the stationarity of the phase-space measure,
the dominance of the equilibrium state already implies that (by far)
most solution trajectories are in equilibrium (by far) most of the time
– which is not quite what we need, but it’s not too far away, either.
2. To define a notion of typicality relative to the current macrostate of the
system, allowing us to assert, for instance, that almost all microstates
in the non-equilibrium region ΓM2 will evolve into equilibrium.
Regarding the meaning of “almost all”, one should note that it’s only in
the idealized situation of a thermodynamic limit (where the number of
microscopic degrees of freedom goes to infinity) that one can expect the
exception set of “bad” configurations to be of measure zero, while if we
argue about a realistic system, the atypicality of such configurations
is substantiated by the fact that they have very very small (though
positive) measure compared to that of all microstates realizing M2.
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In fact, stationarity of the Liouville measure allows us to estimate
the measure of the good microstates relative to the bad microstates
in ΓM2 by the ratio of phase-space volume occupied by M2 to the
phase-space volume corresponding to lower-entropy states. For let
ΓMlow be the region of phase space corresponding to states of (sub-
stantially) lower entropy and let B ⊂ ΓM2 be the set of initial con-
ditions in ΓM2 that will have evolved into ΓMlow after a time ∆t,
then Φ∆t(B) ⊆ ΓMlow and thus |B| = |Φ∆t(B)| ≤ |ΓMlow |, so that
|B| : |ΓM2 | ≈ |ΓMlow | : |ΓM2 | ≈ 1 : 1010
23 .
2.4 Irreversibility
By incorporating into our discussion what is essentially Boltzmann’s answer
to Loschmidt’s reversibility objection, we have already seen how the typi-
cality account solves the greatest challenge to our reductionist enterprise:
the prima facie contradiction between the irreversibility of thermodynamic
processes and the reversibility of the underlying mechanical laws. To em-
phasize how this apparent contradiction is resolved, we recall that it was
crucial to the typicality argument that it referred to (typical or atypical)
initial conditions relative to the initial macrostate. Of course, in terms of
overall phase-space volume, a non-equilibrium macrostate occupies a vanish-
ingly small fraction of phase space to begin with, corresponding (if you will)
to a very low a priori probability. The relevant notion of typicality when
discussing convergence to equilibrium from a non-equilibrium macrostateM2
is thus defined by the phase-space measure conditioned on the fact that the
initial microstate of the system is in the respective (low-entropy) region ΓM2 .
Now, as we already observed, the time-symmetry of the microscopic laws
is manifested in the fact that the phase-space volume occupied by the bad
initial conditions in Γeq, for which the system will fluctuate out of equilibrium
into the macrostateM2 (let’s say), is just as large as the phase-space volume
occupied by the good initial conditions in ΓM2 for which the system will relax
into equilibrium. In other words, over any given period of time, there are
just as many solutions that evolve into equilibrium, as there are solutions
evolving out of equilibrium into a lower entropy state – but the first case
is nevertheless typical for systems in non-equilibrium, whereas the second
case is atypical with respect to all possible equilibrium configurations in
Γeq. It is this fact and this fact alone that establishes the irreversibility of
thermodynamic behavior.
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2.5 The Past Hypothesis and the thermodynamic arrow
By asserting that the origin of the thermodynamic asymmetry lies only
in the specialness of the initial low-entropy macrostates, the typicality ac-
count is shifting the explanatory burden from why it is that a system in
non-equilibrium relaxes to equilibrium (once macroscopic constraints are re-
moved), to why it is that we find systems in such special states in the first
place. Note that a typical configuration simpliciter, i.e. a typical configura-
tion with respect to all possible microstates, is a state for which the system
is in equilibrium, will be in equilibrium for most of its future, and has been
in equilibrium for most of its past – which thus describes a time-symmetric
situation.
Of course, as long as we are preoccupied with boxes of gas or melting
ice-cubes or other confined systems, their low-entropy states will always be
attributable to influences from outside, i.e. to the fact that these systems
are actually part of some larger system (usually containing a physicist, or
a freezer, or the like) from which they “branched off” to undergo a (more
or less) autonomous evolution as (more or less) isolated subsystems. This
presupposes, however, that those larger systems are out of equilibrium them-
selves, otherwise they couldn’t give rise to subsystems with less then maximal
entropy without violating the second law. Hence, if we think this through to
the end, we arrive at the question why it is that we find our universe in such
a very special state, far away from equilibrium (and how we justify our be-
lieve that its state was even more special the farther we go back in the past).
This is what Goldstein calls the “hard part of the problem [of irreversibil-
ity]” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 49) and it concerns, broadly speaking, the origin of
irreversibility and the thermodynamic arrow of time in our universe. Dealing
with the “hard problem” would require us to discuss the meaning and the
status of the Past Hypothesis1 stipulating a very-low-entropy beginning of
our universe. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper
and we shall return to it only briefly in the course of our discussion.
1The term “Past Hypothesis” is due to Albert (2000), though the necessity of such
an assumption was already noted by Boltzmann (1896a, pp. 252–53). See also Feynman
(1967) and Carroll (2010) for a very nice discussion.
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3 Typicality and the H-theorem
Although the formula engraved on Boltzmann’s tombstone is equation (1),
connecting the entropy of a microstate with the “probability” of the corre-
sponding macrostate, his name is at least as intimately associated with the
Boltzmann equation and the H-theorem, describing, in a more quantitative
manner, convergence to equilibrium for a low-density gas. This H-theorem
is of great interest in the light of our previous discussion, first, because it
illustrates very clearly the need for a typicality argument and second, be-
cause it can be viewed as a concrete implementation of the general scheme
that we’ve just presented as the “typicality account”. By expanding on these
points, we also want to counter two misconceptions regarding the H-theorem
that seem to be wide-spread in the contemporary literature. These mis-
conceptions have most likely arisen from Boltzmann’s first presentation of
the H-theorem but persisted despite his more refined argumentation in later
writings. The first misconception is manifested in the charge that the ex-
planation of macroscopic irreversibility in the context of the H-theorem is
begging the question, because the derivation of the Boltzmann equation is
grounded in an explicitly time-asymmetric assumption about the microscopic
dynamics (see e.g. Uffink, 2008; Price, 1996, 2002).
The second, more basic misunderstanding is that the H-theorem and
the typicality account are somehow competing accounts of macroscopic irre-
versibility and the convergence to equilibrium. Witness, for instance2, Huw
Price who writes with respect to the latter:
In essence, I think – although he himself does not present it in
these terms – what Boltzmann offers is an alternative to his own
famous H-Theorem. The H-theorem offers a dynamical argument
that the entropy of a non-equilibrium system must increase over
time, as a result of collisions between its constituent particles.
[...] The statistical approach does away with this dynamical ar-
gument altogether. (Price, 2002, p. 27)
We are convinced that the reason why Boltzmann did not present the “sta-
tistical approach” as an alternative to the H-theorem is that, in fact, it isn’t.
Understood correctly, there is a clear conceptual continuity between the H-
theorem and the typicality account, so that the latter does not appear as
2Similarly, the pertinent entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Uffink,
2008) presents Boltzmann’s work as a series of rather incoherent (and ultimately wanting)
attempts to explain the second law.
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a break with Boltzmann’s earlier work but as a distillation of its essence
(cf. Goldstein, 2012; Goldstein and Lebowitz, 2004). To make this case, we
shall first review what the H-theorem is about and how it’s grounded in the
microscopic theory.3
3.1 Boltzmann’s equation and the H-theorem
Recall that the microstate of an N -particle system is represented by a point
X = (q1, ..., qN ; p1, ..., pN ) ∈ Ω in 6N -dimensional phase space, compris-
ing the position and momenta of all particles. The same state (modulo
permutations of the particles) can also be represented as N points in the
6-dimensional µ-space, whose coordinates correspond to position and veloc-
ity of a single particle, i.e. X → {(q1, v1), ..., (qN , vN )}, with vi := pi/m.
The H-theorem is concerned with the evolution of a function fX(q, v) on
µ-space, that is supposed to provide an efficient description of the most im-
portant (macroscopic) characteristics of the gas in the microstate X. This
function is defined as the empirical distribution or coarse-grained density of
points in µ-space. In principle, one can think of dividing µ-space into little
cells whose dimension is large enough to contain a great number of particles,
yet very small compared to the resolution of macroscopic observations, and
counting the number of particles in each cell. For fixed q and v, fX(q, v)
thus corresponds to the proportion of particles located near q with velocity
approximately v. In the limit where the size of the cells goes to zero, the
empirical distribution becomes the actual distribution
fX(t)(q, v) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(q − qi(t)) δ(v − 1
m
pi(t)).
We give this formula to emphasize that, although fX(q, v) is technically a
probability measure, there’s is nothing random about it. In fact, it’s more
adequate to think of it as a macroscopic variable, determined, as it always is,
by the microscopic configuration of the system. In particular, the distribu-
tion function does not describe a random system or an ensemble of systems
but pertains to a coarse-grained description of an individual system, so that
every microstate X determines a unique fX(q, v), while many different mi-
croscopic configurations will coarse-grain to the same µ-space density.
Now the first crucial result is that although the empirical distribution
can be different for different microscopic configurations X, it is in fact (more
3For a good introduction, see, for instance, Davies (1977). For a detailed mathematical
treatment, see Spohn (1991), Villani (2002), Lebowitz (1981).
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or less) the same for an overwhelming majority of possible X. That is, one
can show that for typical X ∈ Γ, the distribution function is of the form
fX(q, v) ∝ e− 12mβv2 ,
for some constant β that is later identified with the inverse temperature of
the system. This is the famous Maxwell or Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution,
which is hence the equilibrium distribution of the gas. The distribution
having no q-dependence means that the gas is homogeneously distributed
over the entire volume with no correlations between position and velocities,
i.e. with uniform temperature.
The goal of Boltzmann’s famous H-theorem is thus to show the con-
vergence of an initial non-equilibrium distribution f0(q, v) to the Maxwell-
distribution feq(q, v). The result is thereby based on three claims:
1) For a low-density gas, the time-evolution of fX(t)(q, v) is well described
by an effective equation now known as the Boltzmann equation.
Starting with an initial distribution f0(q, v) = fX0(q, v), it’s important
to distinguish the function fX(t)(q, v) – whose time-evolution is always
determined by that of the microstate X(t) – from the solution f(t, q, v)
of the Boltzmann equation with initial condition f(0, q, v) = f0(q, v) (re-
spectively a smooth approximation thereof). The relevant claim is then
that for typical initial conditions, fX(t)(q, v) will be (in a precisely spec-
ified way) close to f(t, q, v) for a sufficiently long period of time, thus
providing an effective description of the system’s time-evolution.
2) For a solution f(t, q, v) of the Boltzmann-equation, the H-function
H(f(t, q, v)) :=
∫
f(t, q, v) log f(t, q, v)dqdv
is monotonously decreasing in t.4
3) The H-functional reaches itsminimum for the Maxwell-distribution feq(q, v).
Together with 2) this implies, in particular, that the Maxwell-distribution
is a stationary solution of the Boltzmann-equation.
Statements 2) and 3) are fairly standard mathematical results. The crux
of the matter lies in statement 1). When Boltzmann first presented the H-
theorem in 1872, he argued that a diluted gas must evolve in accord with
4While the “true” microscopic H(fX(t)(q, v)) fluctuates and only decreases “on average”.
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his equation; he later had to mitigate this statement claiming, in effect, only
that it would typically do so. Indeed, we will see that 1), and therefore the
H-theorem, are genuinely typicality statements.
3.2 Molecular chaos
Boltzmann’s derivation of what is now known as the Boltzmann equation is
famously based on the Stoßzahlansatz or the assumption of molecular chaos.5
This is an assumption about the relative frequencies of collisions between
the particles in the gas. Denoting by N (t, q; v1, v2) the number of collisions
happening near q in a small time-interval around t between particles with
velocity (approximately) v1 and v2, the Stoßzahlansatz is:
N (t, q ; v1, v2) ∝ N2 f(t, q, v1)f(t, q, v2) |v1 − v2| dtdq dv1dv2, (2)
i.e. the relative frequency of scattering events between particles of different
velocities happening in the cell around q is assumed to be proportional to the
density of particles with the respective velocities near the respective position.
The scattering probability being proportional to the product of f(t, q, v1)
and f(t, q, v2) means that particles of different velocities are assumed to
be statistically independent as they contribute to collisions. This is, more
specifically, the meaning of molecular chaos.
Boltzmann’s derivation, although a brilliant physical argument, was far
from a rigorous proof. There are many mathematical subtleties involved
in statement 1), concerning, for instance, the existence and uniqueness of
solutions to the Boltzmann equation. However, if we can generously overlook
these technical points, it is true that if and as long as the assumption of
molecular chaos and equation (2) are valid, statement 1) is correct. Hence,
we have to ask: What is the status of molecular chaos and how is it justified?
First and foremost, we have to keep in mind that there is nothing random
about the interactions in a gas. Which particles are going to collide and how
they are going to collide is completely determined by the initial conditions of
the system and the microscopic laws of motion. For the purpose of illustra-
tion, let’s imagine that we could freeze the system at time t = 0 and arrange
the position and momentum of every single particle before letting the clock
run and the system evolve according to the deterministic laws of Newtonian
5Assumption, unfortunately, is not a perfectly accurate translation of the German
word Ansatz. Whereas the first is sometimes used synonymously with a logical premise,
the later has a distinctly pragmatic element and can refer to something more akin to an
“approximation” or a “working hypothesis”.
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mechanics. (Note that there is no issue here as to whether we let the clock
run “forwards” or “backwards” – the problem is symmetric with respect to
the time-evolution in both directions.) We could then, for instance, arrange
the initial state in such a way that “slow” particles will almost exclusively
scatter with other “slow” particles and “fast” particles with other “fast” par-
ticles. But such initial configurations are obviously very special ones. For
typical microscopic configurations, coarse-graining to the initial distribution
f0(q, v), we will find that the relative frequency with which particles of dif-
ferent velocities meet for the first collision is roughly proportional to the
density of particles with the respective velocities near the respective posi-
tion, i.e. given by eq. (2). This is nothing more and nothing less than the
law of large numbers, based, in effect, on simple combinatorics. The validity
of (2) at the initial time is thus, as all law-of-large-number statements, a
typicality statement and as such another mathematical fact.
We observe here the fundamental difference between the probability den-
sity f(t, q, v) and the typicality measure. The “scattering probability” at
time t is defined in terms of f(t, q, v), though it’s only for typical ini-
tial conditions that the relative frequency of scatterings is actually close
to the expectation value. And typical initial conditions are defined, as
usual, by the microcanonical measure restricted to the initial macro-region
Γ0 := {X ∈ ΓE | fX(q, v) = f0(q, v)}.
This brings us, finally, to the critical part of the H-theorem. For as-
sume that after an (infinitesimal) time-interval ∆t for which the validity of
the Boltzmann-equation is established, the distribution function has evolved
into f(∆t, q, v). How do we know that (2) is still a good approximation for
all but a small set of initial conditions? It is still true that eq. (2) is satisfied
for typical microscopic configurations realizing the current distribution, i.e.
counting all possible configurations that coarse-grain to f(∆t, q, v). But we
cannot count all these configurations, since the microstates relevant to our
considerations are constraint by the condition that they have evolved from
the macro-region corresponding to the initial distribution f0(q, v). Mathe-
matically, these dynamical constraints on the “combinatorics” translate into
the fact that the µ-space coordinates of the particles at time t > 0 are no
longer statistically independent, making it prima facie questionable whether
a law-or-large-number statement for the relative frequencies of particle colli-
sions, i.e. molecular chaos, still holds. This is, notably, the only meaningful
way in which interactions build up correlations and it should be distinguished
from more naive “causal” intuitions to the effect that the physical states of
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any two individual particles are independent before – but not after – they
collide. Note, in particular, that the described situation is still completely
symmetric between the time evolution towards the “future” and the time
evolution towards the “past” of the distinguished initial state.
Boltzmann’s Stoßzahlansatz now can be understood as the assumption
that statistical independence is (sufficiently well) preserved by the micro-
scopic time-evolution, or, in other words, that the relative frequency of col-
lisions is always the typical one with respect to the current empirical distri-
bution (≈ the current macrostate) of the system. The mathematician refers
to such a proposition as propagation of molecular chaos. Deriving the Boltz-
mann equation from a microscopic model in a rigorous mathematical sense
is thus to validate this ansatz, i.e. to show that for typical initial conditions
equation (2) remains approximately satisfied on sufficiently long time-scales.
Sufficiently long, that is, to describe the thermodynamic evolution of a gas
into equilibrium.
So, does molecular chaos propagate? That is, do the dynamics of a gas
preserve statistical independence well enough to justify the Stoßzahlansatz
over relevant time-scales? Based on physical intuition and various encour-
aging results, there is little doubt that the answer is affirmative. Given that
the microscopic dynamics are very chaotic, that the number of particles in
a gas is huge and the gas, by assumption, very diluted so that re-collisions
(collisions between particles that have already collided in the past) are very
rare, it is highly plausible that the relative frequency of collisions shouldn’t
become too special – in the sense of deviating significantly from the expecta-
tion value (2) – unless the initial configuration itself was very special. And
yet, this is extremely difficult to prove; so difficult, in fact, that, as of to
date, the best mathematical results available are valid only for very short
times and a very restricted class of particle-interactions.6
Moreover, it is important to understand that, unless one considers the
thermodynamic limit of an infinitely large system, equation (2) will hold at
best approximately for all but a small set of “bad” initial conditions, that
this approximation will get worse with time, and that the approximation is
only good enough until it isn’t. Eventually, a typical system will exhibit
sizable fluctuations out of equilibrium at which point its evolution is no
longer adequately described by the Boltzmann equation.
6See Lanford (1975) and King (1975) for the landmark results and Gallagher et al.
(2012), Pulvirenti et al. (2013) for recent extensions to more general potentials.
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3.3 The H-theorem as a typicality statement
With all that said, we can now appreciate the fact that the H-theorem is not
an alternative way to explain convergence to equilibrium and the irreversibil-
ity of thermodynamic behavior, but rather a concrete exemplification of the
explanatory scheme that we have presented before, in more general terms, as
the typicality account. While the micro/macro distinction does not appear
as prominently in the formulation of the H-theorem, it is essential that the
empirical distribution f(q, v) pertains to a coarse-grained description of the
system, hence distinguishing a macro-region in phase space consisting of all
microscopic configurations coarse-graining to the same µ-space density. Con-
vergence to equilibrium is then established for typical initial conditions with
respect to that initial non-equilibrium macro-region. And the equilibrium
state – characterized by the Maxwell-distribution to which a non-equilibrium
distribution typically converges according to the H-theorem – is, as always,
distinguished by the fact that it’s the one realized by an overwhelming ma-
jority of all microscopic configurations. As Boltzmann himself beautifully
explained:
The ensuing, most likely state [...] which we call that of the
Maxwellian velocity-distribution, since it was Maxwell who first
found the mathematical expression in a special case, is not an
outstanding singular state, opposite to which there are infinitely
many more non-Maxwellian velocity-distributions, but it is, to the
contrary, distinguished by the fact that by far the largest num-
ber of all possible states have the characteristic properties of the
Maxwellian distribution, and that compared to this number the
amount of possible velocity-distributions that deviate significantly
from Maxwell’s is vanishingly small. (Boltzmann, 1896a, p. 252,
translation by the authors)
Despite the common focus on the Stoßzahlansatz, there is a compelling case
to make that the tendency to equilibrium is by all means explained by the
dominance of the equilibrium state. (Although it will not appear among the
premises of the H-theorem, nor necessarily as an explicit part of the proof!)
The explanatory role of the Stoßzahlansatz is then somewhat subsidiary to
this insight, namely to express the fact that it’s thus the “most likely” micro-
evolutions that will carry a non-equilibrium distribution into equilibrium.
Finally, we understand that the irreversibility of the Boltzmann equa-
tion (as an effective description of a system’s macro-evolution) is – as it
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cannot be otherwise – a consequence of the fact that non-equilibrium con-
figurations converging to equilibrium are typical with respect to the cor-
responding “macrostate”, whereas microscopic configurations leading to the
time-reversed evolution are atypical with respect to all equilibrium config-
urations, i.e. all microstates coarse-graining to feq(q, v). In particular, the
origin of the asymmetry is, as always, the assumption of a non-equilibrium
(and in this sense special) initial distribution.
As mentioned before, one will often encounter the claim that the irre-
versibility of the Boltzmann equation is a result of the Stoßzahlansatz being
an explicitly time-asymmetric assumption. This is not correct. The assump-
tion of molecular chaos breaks the time-symmetry only in the obvious (and
necessary) sense that it applies to the thermodynamic evolution but not to
the reversed motion; but this does not mean that any time-asymmetry is
smuggled into the derivation of the H-theorem in addition to the one intro-
duced by the assumption of a non-equilibrium initial distribution.
This misunderstanding, we believe, is mostly based on the failure to
recognize molecular chaos, respectively the Stoßzahlansatz, as a typicality
statement. For typical initial conditions, eq. (2) is equally valid for the
time-evolution in both temporal directions. However, the microscopic con-
figurations that have evolved from a state of lower entropy are ipso facto
atypical with respect to their evolution in the reversed (past) time direction.
To put it differently, if the assumption of molecular chaos is justified in
the sense explained before, it will hold for typical initial configurations re-
alizing a non-equilibrium distribution, for which the H-theorem thus asserts
convergence of the distribution function to a Maxwellian distribution (to-
wards the future as well as towards the past) and it will also hold for typical
equilibrium configurations, for which the H-theorem thus asserts that the
equilibrium distribution is stationary. There is no reason, however, why it
must hold for those equilibrium configurations that are the time-reversal of
states that have just evolved from non-equilibrium, which are, after all, a
vanishingly small subset of the equilibrium region. And we know, of course,
that it doesn’t, that those states are precisely contained in the set of bad
configurations for which the particles are correlated in such a way as to
undergo a macro-evolution of decreasing entropy (increasing H) that can-
not be described by the Boltzmann equation. And we also know that the
atypicality of these states (with respect to their evolution in one temporal
direction) is explained by, or at least a necessary consequence of, the fact
that the system is assumed or constrained or observed to be in a special (i.e.
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non-equilibrium) state at one particular moment in time.
The only deeper question that may be left is why the Boltzmann equation
is in fact relevant, i.e. why it is a good description of an actual gas in our
actual world. To understand the answer to this question is thus to appreciate
the meaning and relevance of typicality statements in general.
4 Typicality and the status of macroscopic laws
4.1 The ‘logic’ of typicality statements
One of the hurdles that may have stood in the way of appreciating Boltz-
mann’s contribution and the relevance of typicality is the fact that Nagelian
schemes of reduction and the related deductive-nomological models of phys-
ical explanation did not quite capture the subtleties of Boltzmann’s argu-
ments.7 According to these often criticized yet very persistent theories, a
microscopic explanation of the second law of thermodynamics – respectively
a reduction by the microscopic theory – must be a derivation of the macro-
scopic law from the microscopic laws plus suitably specified “auxiliary as-
sumptions” or “circumstances” in which the macroscopic law is supposed to
hold. There is a sense in which this characterization is correct, although to
get a grip on what sense this is, we’ll have to say more about what we mean
by “derive” and by a “macroscopic law”. First, we want to emphasize one of
the more problematic aspects of this view, which is that an understanding
of the relationship between the macroscopic regularity and the underlying
microscopic laws in purely logical terms misses the crucial role that initial
conditions play in the explanation of a macroscopic phenomenon.
For what is it to derive the thermodynamic behavior of, let’s say, a gas
from the microscopic laws of motion? Is it to show that there exists at least
one microscopic configuration for which the gas will relax to equilibrium?
Is it to show that it will happen for all possible (non-equilibrium) config-
urations? The insufficiency of the first statement and the falsehood of the
second must severely question the adequacy of purely deductive schemes of
explanation. For suppose we wanted to account for the thermodynamic
behavior of a certain type of physical system by a scheme of the form
∀x(F (x) ⇒ G(x)), where x ranges of all possible realizations of the cor-
responding microscopic model and the predicate G is a suitable formulation
7See Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010) for a recent defense of Nagelian reduction. On
typicality, see, e.g., Maudlin (2007), Bricmont (1995), Dürr (2009), Goldstein (2012), and
Zanghì (2005).
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of “showing effectively/approximately thermodynamic behavior”. Then the
antecedent F (x) would have to contain a clause more or less equivalent to
the statement “The initial conditions of the system x are such that G(x)”.
But then the deduction becomes too trivial to be relevant. Of course there
exist initial conditions for which the gas will expand. There are also initial
conditions for which the gas will contract. And initial conditions for which
the gas will transform into a banana. In other words, for a system x with
sufficiently many degrees of freedom and sufficiently non-trivial dynamics
it is practically always possible to maintain that it has the (macroscopic)
property G because the initial conditions were such that G(x). The only
thing that can provide explanatory value in this context is the assertion of
typicality, i.e. the assertion that G is not a feature of certain special initial
conditions, but a physical fact that would arise from almost any initial con-
dition. This is also to assure that the explanatory work is done, as much as
possible, by the fundamental physical laws, rather than by some fine-tuned
arrangement of microscopic degrees of freedom.
Note however that the relevant statement is now, logically and syntacti-
cally, a proposition about G rather than a proposition about any particular
x. The ‘logic’ of the statistical explanation of the second law is thus not
to state a set of (statistical) assumptions about an individual system from
which to infer its thermodynamic behavior, but to spell out a physical ac-
count that grounds the explanation of thermodynamic behavior in the notion
of typicality.
4.2 Typicality vs. probability
Indisputably, the common way of speaking is not to assert that a macroscopic
feature G is typical, but to say G(x) is very likely or that we infer G(x) with
high probability. Such a probabilistic statement must, however, raise two
additional questions: a) what is it supposed to mean? and b) how do we
justify a probabilistic result on the basis of deterministic microscopic laws?
We cannot discuss here in detail how the different “interpretations” of the
concept of probability (subjectivist, frequentist, Humean best system, etc.)
fare in this context, but we want to emphasize a few general points to capture
the intricacy of the issue.
First, it would seem rather odd (and detached from scientific practice) if,
in order to account for the second law of thermodynamics, we would have to
add to the mechanical laws a quantitative assumption about the distribution
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of initial conditions of boxes of gas, or the like, that we find in our universe.
Second, the fact that we are generally ignorant about the exact microstate
of a system is true, but largely irrelevant. It is absurd to think that the
validity of the second law of thermodynamics could in any way depend on
what we know or believe or are able to observe.
Finally, if we are serious about our commitment to argue within the
paradigm of a particular deterministic theory, we have to take it to the con-
clusion that there is nothing more random about the physical processes that
give rise to subsystems in non-equilibrium states than about the entropy-
increasing processes going on within these subsystems, once they are suit-
ably isolated from their environment. Eventually one has to wonder why it
is true as a matter of fact that whenever someone prepares a gas in a low-
entropy state, it never ends up in one of the “bad” microscopic configurations
for which the gas would contract rather than expand. And then one has to
take seriously the fact that an act of “preparation” is itself a physical pro-
cess, following the same set of physical laws, with its outcome determined by
suitably specified initial conditions. Why are these initial conditions always
good ones, then? To defer the source of randomness to the outside, from the
box of gas to the shaky hands of the experimentalist or to exterior perturba-
tions preventing the subsystem from being perfectly isolated, is just to pass
the buck. But the buck must stop, eventually, with the universe itself. For
the universe is what it is, it exists once and only once, there is nothing before
and nothing outside. And we either live in a universe that obeys the second
law of thermodynamics (on cosmological scales and, with the possibility of
very rare exceptions, in its branching sub-systems) or we don’t.
All that said, what is the difference between a statement of probabil-
ity and a typicality statement, and why is typicality the more appropriate
concept in this context?
For one thing, contrary to the conventional use of probabilities, typicality
is not a quantitative concept. The role of the typicality measure is only
to realize and give precise meaning to the notion of “almost all” or “the
overwhelming majority of” initial conditions and although it is common and
convenient and natural to use the Liouville measure, at least in the context
of classical mechanics, many different measures would yield the same notion
of typicality.8 In particular, we are not committed to giving meaning to the
8On the other hand, many measures would yield a different notion of typicality. One
can think, for instance, of singular measures, concentrated on a single point in phase space.
Such a measure may even turn out to be stationary, in case that this particular microstate
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exact number that a typicality measure assigns to every (measurable) subset
of phase space. The only values that are meaningful in this context are 1 (or
those close to 1) and 0 (or those close to 0) indicating what Bernoulli called
moral certainty and moral impossibility.9 Probability statements – as an
expression of statistical regularities – can then be grounded in such typicality
statements, e.g. by asserting that the probability (∼ relative frequency) of
‘heads’ or ‘tails’ in a typical series of coin tosses is 1/2.
Second, in making a typicality statement, we do not commit ourselves
to talking about actual or hypothetical ensembles of systems, nor do we
use probabilistic concepts to express our “guess” – in terms of information
or knowledge or believe – about a system’s actual microstate. A typicality
statement refers to nothing more and nothing less than the fact that a cer-
tain (coarse-grained/macroscopic) property or behavior of a physical system
is typical given the respective microscopic laws, i.e. that it’s the kind of prop-
erty or behavior that our fundamental theory predicts for an overwhelming
majority of microscopic configurations compatible with appropriately speci-
fied (macroscopic) boundary conditions: Typically, a coin tossed repeatedly
(and fairly) for a large number of times will land about as often on heads
as on tails. Typically, an ice cube at room temperate will melt. Accord-
ing to the laws of quantum mechanics, a series of particles shot through
a double-slit will typically (though not necessarily) display an interference
pattern when registered on a screen behind the slits. According to classical
mechanics, it typically won’t (though it possibly might).
A typicality statement is thus an objective physical fact, in principle
derivable from the fundamental (microscopic) laws that we take as the basis
of our considerations. (It is a fact that even Laplace’s demon should care
about, to the degree that he cares about physics.) But what exactly is
it a fact about? Well, typicality is, first and foremost, the answer to the
question that stood at the very beginning of our discussion, namely: what is
the connection between themacroscopic regularities that physics is supposed
to account for and the underlying microscopic laws. Another way to put this
happens to be a stationary point of the dynamics. So why not take such a measure to
define “typicality”, meaning that a property is typical if and only if it is instantiated by
this one particular configuration? We trust the reader to answer this question for himself.
9See Bernoulli (1713). Such typicality statements can be understood in the sense
of Cournot’s principle, which is one of the basic principles underlying the philosophy
of Kolmogorov’s Grundbegriffe, but also stands in the philosophical tradition of great
mathematicians such as Emile Borel, Maurice Fréchet or Paul Lévy. See Shafer and Volk
(2006) for a beautiful essay on this topic.
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is to ask: What is the nomological status of the “macroscopic laws”?
4.3 The status of macroscopic laws
Philosophically, the truly remarkable yet often unacknowledged aspect about
the probabilistic character of thermodynamic laws is not the way in which
laws that once have been thought to be exact turn out to be merely approx-
imately true, but the way in which the regularities expressed by these laws
turn out to be contingent rather than necessary truths. In other words, if
we accept the microscopic laws as fundamental, we have to concede that the
so-called macroscopic laws, even in an approximate or statistical sense, are
in fact no laws at all in that they lack the status of nomological necessity.
For all we know, the initial condition of our universe (conceived as a New-
tonian universe) could have been such that systems, prepared or created in
a low-entropy state, would regularly end up on one of the “bad” trajectories
that undergo an anti-thermodynamic evolution. That is to say that there
are possible Newtonian universes in which gases are regularly found to con-
tract rather than expand, in which heat does sometimes flow from a colder
to a hotter body and in which macroscopic objects such as balls and chairs
and tables occasionally jump up in the air (while cooling off accordingly to
account for the conservation of energy) simply because a large number of
particles happen to move in the same direction at the same time. In these
counterfactual yet (nomologically) possible universes, it is simply not true
that such events are very unlikely because they happen all the time.10
And yet, we would insist, it’s more than a mere contingency, more than
a factum brutum that our universe is not like that. And indeed, our physical
theory has more to say here – notabene without assigning us the impossible
task of determining the actual boundary conditions of our universe – for it
tells us that the initial conditions of a Newtonian universe would have to
be exceedingly special to give rise to subsystems violating thermodynamic
laws as more than astronomically rare exceptions. Thermodynamic laws,
in other words, are statistical regularities of typical universes. And it is this
characterization, we suggest, that specifies their connection to the underlying
microscopic laws and grounds their own law-like status.
Kripke (1980) famously explained the difference between logical and
10Of course, among all possible Newtonian universes there will be some with no thermo-
dynamic arrow and no interesting structures at all. But here, to make a point, we consider
universes that are hospitable to intelligent life, while the second law of thermodynamics
fails to hold in branching systems just so often as to make a fool out of physicists.
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nomological supervenience by the following metaphor: B-properties super-
vene logically on A-properties if, after fixing the A-properties of the world,
there was nothing else God could (or needed to) do for fixing the B-properties.
The A-properties, we say, logically entail the B-properties. In case of a nomo-
logical supervenience, however, God, after making sure of the A-facts, still
had some work to do for making sure of the B-facts by determining laws
of nature relating B-properties to A-properties. Going one step further we
could say: a property of our world that is typical for these laws is a fact or
regularity for which God, after fixing the laws of nature and the fundamental
ontology of the world, still had a little bit of work to do in choosing appropri-
ate initial conditions for our universe. However, while almost any possible
choice (compatible with the relevant macroscopic constraints) would have
been fine to make sure that this property is instantiated, God would’ve had
to be utterly meticulous – and maybe somewhat malicious – to arrange the
initial configuration of the universe in such a way that isn’t.
Turning back to the ‘second law’, we have to note one subtlety in con-
nection with the Past Hypothesis (see Section 2). According to the Past
Hypothesis, the initial macrostate of our universe was a very special one,
marking the low-entropy end of the thermodynamic arrow of time. How-
ever, with respect to this macrostate, the initial microstate of the universe
was typical (in regard to its future evolution), thus explaining the increase
of entropy in the universe as a whole and in any of its branching subsystems.
All in all, there is no contradiction, but a clear tension between the typicality
account and the Past Hypothesis. The resolution of this tension is considered
by many as one of the most profound problems of modern physics.11
What else is left to say? Not much, we believe. To understand that
a certain regularity is typical and yet to wonder why it is that we observe
this regularity in nature (and why we should expect this regularity to persist
in the future), is to ask why our universe is typical, i.e. why it is, in this
particular respect, like the overwhelming majority of all possible universes
instantiating the same set of fundamental laws. And while we don’t know
how to answer, except maybe with Einstein’s bon mot that “God is subtle,
but he is not malicious”, the very question seems to us utterly uncompelling.
11See, for instance, Penrose (1999) and his “Weyl curvature hypothesis” as a proposal
for an additional law restricting the initial state of the universe, but also Callender (2004)
arguing from a Humean perspective against the need for further explanation of the Past
Hypothesis. See Carroll (2010) for a very nice discussion of the problem and ibid. as well
as Carroll and Chen (2004) for an attempt to dispose of the Past Hypothesis altogether.
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Explanations have to end somewhere. If we can establish that a certain
property is typical for a particular kind of system, this should elevate any
sense of mystery or puzzlement as to why we find such systems instantiating
the respective property. Hence, we should consider the phenomenon to be
reasonably and conclusively explained on the basis of the microscopic theory.
Similarly, if we can establish that a macroscopic feature or regularity is
typical for a certain kind of system, we should by all reasonable means expect
to find this feature realized in a given system of said kind. In this sense, it
constitutes a prediction of the microscopic theory.
In this fashion, typicality statements figure in a way of reasoning about
nature. In fact, since the situation in which we find ourselves towards the
world is necessarily one in which all we can ever hope to know about the
world’s state is compatible with a plurality of fundamental (microscopic)
matters of fact, the relevant explanatory and behavior guiding statements
that we can extract from the fundamental laws of physics are virtually always
results about typical solutions of the equations of motion.
Finally, we shall emphasize again that a typicality reasoning is a non-
deductive reasoning. Logically, the fact that something has been shown to
be typical doesn’t imply anything about any particular instance. In other
words, it is always possible for a particular system – and ultimately our
universe – to be atypical in the relevant respect. But facts that strike us as
atypical are usually the kind of facts that cry out for further explanation.
This is why a Casino manager has not just economic interest but reasonable
grounds to suspect cheating if a player hits three jackpots in a single night.
And this is why good scientific practice would eventually require us to revise
our theory and look for a different set of laws, rather than endorsing an
explanation of empirical data based on special initial conditions or, if you
will, a streak of bad luck. In the end, it is not logically but epistemically
inconsistent to accept a certain physical theory and accept at the same time
that our universe is (in any relevant respect) an atypical model of that theory,
for this would undermine any reasons to endorse the theory in the first place.
5 Reply to critics
In this final section, we are going to address the most common objections to
the typicality account that have been raised in the contemporary philosoph-
ical literature. We will argue that these objections are unfounded and often
based on unnecessary misunderstandings of the actual argument.
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5.1 Missing the point of typicality
One of the most common mistakes in the debate about Boltzmann’s statisti-
cal mechanics is the failure to appreciate the difference between a typicality
statement and an inference about particular instances. Consider for example
the objection of Roman Frigg in reply to Goldstein (2001):
Goldstein suggests that a system approaches equilibrium simply
because the overwhelming majority of states in ΓE are equilib-
rium microstates [...]. This is wrong. If a system is in an atypical
microstate [...], it does not evolve into a equilibrium microstate
just because the latter are typical; typical states do not automat-
ically function as attractors. (Uffink, 2007, 979–980) provides
the following example. Consider a trajectory x(t), i.e. the set
{x(t) = φt(x(t0)) | t ∈ [t0,∞)}, a set of measure zero in ΓE.
Its complement, the set ΓE \ x(t) of points not laying on x(t),
has measure one. Hence the points on x(t) are atypical while
the ones not on x(t) are typical (with respect to ΓE, µ, and the
property ‘being on x(t)’). But from this we cannot conclude that
a point on x(t) eventually has to move away from x(t) and end
up in Γ \ x(t); in fact the uniqueness theorem for solutions tells
us that it does not. The moral is that non-equilibrium states do
not evolve into equilibrium states simply because there are over-
whelmingly more of the latter than of the former, i.e. because the
former are atypical and the latter are typical. (Frigg, 2009, pp.
8–9).
Of course, no one suggests, in the naive sense implied by Frigg, that any spe-
cific trajectory must move to equilibrium “simply because” the overwhelming
majority of states are equilibrium states – just as no one suggests that any
specific lottery ticket must lose “simply because” the overwhelming majority
of possible combinations are losing combinations. In the alluded sense, a
lottery ticket loses simply because someone picked the wrong numbers and
a system converges to equilibrium simply because its microscopic evolution
carries the configuration into equilibrium. What adds explanatory value in
these cases is not a statement that identifies further cause or sufficient rea-
son for why the respective result must obtain in any single instance, but a
statement which asserts that the instances in which it does obtain are the
typical ones. In particular, Goldstein’s argument – which is the same as our
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argument, which is the same as Boltzmann’s argument – is not about what
every single solution trajectory must do, but about what the great majority
of them will (i.e. for typical initial conditions).
So what is the point of the “counterexample” that was formulated by Jos
Uffink and that made such an impression on Frigg? Evidently, it is correct
that a solution x(t) will never enter the phase-space region ΓE\{x(t)} despite
the fact that this set has measure one. Typical solutions, however, will. In
fact, it follows from the “uniqueness theorem” that every other solution (with
the same total energy) lies entirely in ΓE \ {x(t)}. Hence, leaving aside
the fact that this artificially crafted phase-space region is of no physical
interest to begin with, it remains unclear what the example is supposed to
demonstrate and how it’s supposed to hit the typicality account. With all
due respect, the debate seems a bit like some people trying to explain that
typical lottery tickets will fail to win the jackpot because of the huge number
of possible combinations, while others are running around with a winning
lottery ticket in order to disprove them.
5.2 The ‘measure zero problem’
If Uffink’s example works at all, then as another instance of the notorious
measure zero problem which is basically the observation that, as soon as we
go to a more fine-grade description, any physical system is found to be atyp-
ical with respect to some (more or less natural) properties. In particular, for
a continuous state-space and a nonsingular measure, the actual microscopic
configuration and, as we just noted, even the entire trajectory of a system
will constitute a set of measure zero. While this observation is almost tra-
ditionally presented as a serious challenge to typicality arguments (not least
by Frigg himself, 2009, p. 23, but see also, e.g., Sklar, 1973) we don’t believe
it to cause much of an embarrassment for the kind of reasoning we have
defended so far.
There are facts and regularities that can be explained on the basis of the
microscopic laws by virtue of being typical (like ice-cubes melting at high
temperature). There are contingent facts about physical systems that are not
typical, but can be explained in a different sense – usually by tracing them
back to other (even more) special states of affair. For instance, the current
state of our office is certainly atypical with respect to the exact distribution
of objects on the desk, but we can tell some sort of causal story about how a
used coffee mug ended up near the keyboard and how the blue book came to
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lie on top of the heavier red one. Finally there are facts like the one that a
trajectory through some state-space will never cross its complement – which
do not require further explanation but are well-suited for creating confusion
where none is due.
5.3 Misidentifying the macrostates
One objection to the typicality account that we have encountered on various
occasions goes back to Lavis (2005) and attacks the very foundation of Boltz-
mann’s argument by claiming that the equilibrium macrostate (the state of
highest entropy) will not generally make up the largest part of phase space.
Allegedly, this is because states of lower entropy might be “degenerate” with
the sum of their measures exceeding the measure of the equilibrium region.
The premise of Lavis’ argument follows Boltzmann’s combinatorial anal-
ysis of the gas in a box, in which the volume of the box is coarse-grained
into finitely many cells while counting the number of particles in each cell.
Lavis observes – considering, for instance, the simple case of N = 8 par-
ticles distributed over m = 4 cells – that while the most likely occupation
(2, 2, 2, 2) (meaning: every cell contains exactly two particles) corresponds
to larger phase-space measure than, say, (3, 2, 2, 1), there are actually 12
different permutations of (3, 2, 2, 1), all describing possible macroscopic con-
figurations. Hence, he continues, the sum of the measures of such degenerate
states exceed that of the largest “macrostate” (2, 2, 2, 2), which Boltzmann –
according to Lavis – would identify as thermodynamic equilibrium.
It is hard to understand, from our point of view, how this could have
caught on as a serious issue in Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics. Of course,
while having exactly N/m particles in each of the m cells is more likely (cor-
responding to larger phase-space volume) than any other specific occupation
of cells, this is overall a very special situation. In fact, the probability of this
exact equidistribution goes to zero as N becomes large. However, for large
(macroscopic) N and small (microscopic) particles, having precisely N/m
particles in each of the m cells is macroscopically indistinguishable from con-
figurations in which some cells contain one or two or ten or even a million
particles more than others. To suggest that a gas is already out of equilib-
rium if there are, say, a few more molecules on the left side of the box than
on the right side of the box is to miss the whole point of the micro/macro
distinction in the first place (and to attack a bad caricature of Boltzmann’s
argument).
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In other words, the exact equidistribution of the particles over the cells
(that Lavis falsely identifies with thermodynamic equilibrium) and the small
deviations from this exact equidistribution (that he wants to weigh against
the former) actually coarse-grain to one and the same macrostate, all corre-
sponding to thermodynamic equilibrium.
More precisely, it is an elementary result of probability theory that, for
large N , the phase-space measure is concentrated on configurations for which
the number of particles in each cell deviates at most ∼
√
N
m from the mean
value. For N ≈ 1023 andm N , this means that microstates corresponding
to local density-fluctuations of less than a billionth of a percent exhaust
almost the entire phase-space volume. In all or most circumstances, this
would correspond to the relevant and appropriate notion of thermodynamic
equilibrium.
In conclusion, the case presented by Lavis has very litte to do with the
degeneracy of lower-entropy states and everything with considering reason-
able macrostates in the first place. In general, while one shouldn’t discount
the possibility to come up with some pathological counterexample (rather
than a wrong one), the degeneracy of entropy levels is not a real issue. As
repeatedly emphasized, the phase-space measures corresponding to different
entropy levels do not vary only by a little, but by a great many orders of mag-
nitude, so that even all lower-entropy states taken together will in general
correspond to much smaller phase-space volume than a single macrostate
of larger entropy. In particular, the entire non-equilibrium region of phase
space is minuscule compared to the phase-space region corresponding to
thermodynamic equilibrium.
5.4 The role of the dynamics
Recently, the typicality account has come under attack in the philosophical
literature for its lack of mathematical rigor and the alleged failure to make
precise the dynamical assumptions on which the argument is supposed to
rest (Uffink, 2008; Frigg, 2009, 2011; Frigg and Werndl, 2011, 2012). Frigg
and Werndl (2012) even go as far as declaring that the typicality account is
“mysterious” because the “connection with the dynamics” is unclear (p. 918).
Jos Uffink writes on a similar note (as a conclusion to his “counterexample”
discussed in 5.1):
[I]n order to obtain any satisfactory argument why the system
should tend to evolve from non-equilibrium states to the equilib-
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rium state, we should make some assumptions about its dynamics.
In any case, judgments like ‘reasonable’ or ‘ridiculous’ remain
partly a matter of taste. The reversibility objection is a request
for mathematical proof (which, as the saying goes, is something
that even convinces an unreasonable person). (Uffink, 2007, p.
61)
We have already seen that these objections (in particular the ones by Frigg
and Uffink, but see also Frigg and Werndl, 2012, who refer explicitly to
Frigg, 2009, 2011) are based to a large degree on a simple misunderstand-
ing of what the typicality account actually argues for. Other than that, the
dissatisfaction expressed by these authors is clearly based on a certain ex-
pectation about what an explanation of thermodynamic behavior (or maybe
a physical explanation in general) is supposed to be. Upon the most rea-
sonable reading of their queries, the authors insist that an account of the
‘second law’ would have to involve a precise mathematical assumption about
a system’s microscopic dynamics that logically implies its thermodynamic
behavior (see also Frigg and Werndl, 2011, p. 632). Admittedly, the typ-
icality account doesn’t quite live up to this expectation. However, we are
convinced that this sort of naive deductive explanation is neither possible
nor necessary nor, in fact, desirable.
To begin with, we should emphasize again that the typicality account
is – by design – an explanation or an explanatory scheme, not a proof.
And while everyone is entitled to his epistemic standards, there are good
reasons why (to paraphrase Uffink) a reasonable person is sometimes willing
to settle for less than a mathematical theorem. If as an explanation of
macroscopic phenomena we accepted nothing short of rigorous proof, the
atomic hypothesis would yet have to earn its merits.
When it comes to the subtle issue of macro-to-micro reduction, it lies in
the nature of the problem that rigorous results are rare and difficult to come
by. Obviously, we cannot just solve the equations of motion for N ≈ 1023
particles to check if the typicality account tells us the right story about a
systems thermodynamic behavior. Instead, a mathematical physicist has to
look for appropriate models and tools, simplifications and idealizations to
bridge the gap between the beauty and simplicity of the fundamental micro-
scopic laws and the complexity of the macroscopic world. This is neither a
straightforward nor a purely deductive process. But rather than acknowl-
edging that life – and physics – is sometimes hard, certain approaches to the
foundations of statistical mechanics (in particular, the various ergodic pro-
32
grams, old and new) have succumbed to the idea that if we just find the right
mathematical language (e.g. if we study microscopic models on the level of
dynamical systems) the dynamics of a trillion trillion interacting particles,
that are just extremely complicated and complex and difficult to handle,
will somehow reduce to a simple and concise mathematical property that
can serve as an explenans for thermodynamic behavior. But these programs
have not only been (so far) unsuccessful, their whole premise seems to us ut-
terly naive and there is simply no good reason to expect that it should even
be possible to identify such a specific dynamical property as some authors
have in mind.
Maybe more importantly, there is also no compelling reason to insist
on such a property. Some critics may have missed the fact that it is not
by omission but a result of Boltzmann’s analysis that his explanation of
thermodynamic behavior doesn’t rely on any special feature of the micro-
scopic time-evolution. What we learn from this analysis, is, simply put, that
the role of the dynamics is basically restricted to carrying a great major-
ity of microstates, starting out in a designated, vanishingly small region of
phase space that corresponds to thermodynamic non-equilibrium, reason-
ably quickly into the rest of phase space that corresponds to thermodynamic
equilibrium. And this is so much weaker and so much more evident as an
“assumption” about the dynamics of thermodynamic systems that it’s hard
to see how it could be further explained or made more plausible by reducing
it to a more formal and abstract mathematical concept.
Finally, we have to make the general point that – contrary to what certain
philosophical theories have claimed and contrary to what certain authors
have come to take for granted – there is a difference between a physical
explanation and a logical deduction starting from a complete set of precise
axioms. For while it lies in the nature of mathematical proof and logical
deduction that the truth of the conclusion depends rigidly on the truth of
the premises, it is essential for a good physical argument to be reasonably
stable against small deviations from its underlying assumptions, in particular
when they are themselves the result of approximations and idealizations (see
Schwartz, 1992, for a beautiful elaboration on this point.)
Against this backdrop, one reason why it’s not useful to tie the explana-
tion of thermodynamic irreversibility to a very specific and precise charac-
teristic of the dynamical system is that any such characteristic is bound to
be very sensitive to small changes in the microscopic model or boundary con-
ditions. For instance, it is often claimed that ergodic properties are essential
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to the explanation of thermodynamic behavior and many philosophers such
as Frigg and Werndl have engaged in the debate whether the assumption of
ergodicity – or some variant thereof – actually applies to the gas models most
commonly studied by physicists and mathematicians. However, regardless
of the mathematical interest in this question, the debate is rather pointless
from a foundational point of view. For while it may or may not be the case
that a hard-sphere gas in an ellipsoidal box with perfectly reflecting walls
is ergodic12, the slightest perturbation of the interaction potential or the
slightest inhomogeneity in the walls would most likely destroy this special
feature anyhow. In particular, the very question whether, say, the air in
your living room has good ergodic properties (or is accurately modeled by a
system with good ergodic properties) is not just hopeless but ridiculous.
The details of ergodicity (or its variant promoted by Frigg and Werndl)
need not concern us here, for the moral of this story is that, regardless of
the merits of certain formal concepts, our physical and philosophical under-
standing of thermodynamic behavior should better not depend too rigidly on
any such specific and narrowly defined mathematical premise if it’s supposed
to apply to anything more than highly idealized models.
None of this is to say that we shouldn’t continue the efforts to corrob-
orate Boltzmann’s insights with rigorous mathematical results. However, it
is important to understand that, contrary to what some commentators have
suggested, the difference between the explanatory scheme that we have pre-
sented and a more rigorous proof of thermodynamic behavior is not some
secret ingredient like a dynamical assumption that proponents of the typi-
cality account have missed to specify, but a heap of very hard, very technical
work in mathematical physics. Good physics and good philosophy of physics,
on the other hand, is also about appreciating where our understanding of
an issue depends on rigorous formalization and technical proof and where it
doesn’t.
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